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Abstract 
Purpose – this study aims to investigate how those directors of listed companies to make profits when their firms 
were listed to public.  
Design/methodology/approach –This is an empirical study; we adopted the formula from Ritter (2001) for this 
research.  
Findings -this study finds that directors of issuing companies usually get benefits from the money left on the table 
due to two factors. First, they usually retain larger percentage of shares before or after the companies going public; 
second, the first-day closing market price is normally higher than the initial file price ranges (defined as the 
expected price per share by issuing companies just before the firms go public). Originality/value - the findings may 
be used for future academic research literatures which focus on IPO or primary market. This research would help 
individual investors better understanding primary market especially IPO market. 
Key words: IPO, Listed companies, Directors, Money on the table, Shareholders 
JEF Classification: F300. G100. G150 
1. Introduction 
Ritter (2000) finds that during 1990-1998, companies going public in the United States left more than $27 billion on 
the table. During 1999-2000, the amount of money left on the table jumps to $51 billion, where the money left on 
the table is defined as the first-day price gain multiplied by the number of shares sold (see Table One).      
A portion of the money left on the table comes at the expense of preissue shareholders. Most companies going 
public are relatively young firms with large blocks of equity owned by the small business owners as the firm’s board 
of directors. Thus throughout most of the article, we will use the terms “preissue shareholders” or “directors” 
interchangeably with the notion of the small business owners who are taking their firm public, so as to continue 
growing the firm. 
Although preissue shareholders leave a large amount of money on the table, we find that the owners commonly gain 
more than they lose during the IPO process. The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence that whether 
issuing directors get benefits from money left on the table depends on two factors. One of the factors is that these 
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owners usually control large percentage of shares before or after their firms going public. The second one is the 
first-day closing market prices usually are higher than the initial file price ranges, where the initial file price range is 
defined as the expected value per share by preissue shareholders just a few days before the IPO initially announced. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows, section 2 is literature reviews. Section 3 is data section and 
methodology, section 4 is the samples and empirical analysis, and conclusion is in section 5. 
2. Literature review 
The money was left on the table which is associated with the high initial return (the price change measured from the 
offering price to the market price on the first trading day) in IPOs of common stock. The existence of the high initial 
return phenomenon in IPOs is well known by the economic literature, and seems to be a common characteristic of 
most international markets, as highlighted by Loughran et al. (1994). 
Most of theoretical models explaining IPO important initial share three features: imperfect information and agency 
costs among firms, intermediates, and investors; choice and institutional setting of introduction procedure and; 
investors over–optimism in hot issue markets.  
Rock (1986) categorizes investors into two types: informed and uninformed. He gives the winner’s curse hypothesis 
to explain the IPO underpricing. Benveniste and Spindt(1989) state that the underpricing is a means to induce 
informed investors to reveal private information about the demand for shares in the pre-selling phase, thus allowing 
the intermediates to better evaluate the offering. Ritter (1998) names Benveniste and Spinet’s (1989) hypothesis as 
the market feedback hypothesis. 
 Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Welch (1989) and Chemmanur (1993) instead identify 
the firm’s managers as the informed party , and interpret the underpricing as a “ signal” of a firm’s quality and as a 
meant of counter balance the costs borne  by the investors in collecting information. 
Ritter (1998) states that, in order to generate excess demand and be able to have a large number of small 
shareholders, issuing firms intentionally underprice their shares. The disperse ownership will both increase the 
liquidity of the market for the stock it more difficult for outsiders to challenge management. 
There also are several financial economists explain the relationship between directors’ benefits and the money left 
on the table. 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) state entrepreneurs do not get upset about money left on the table. Trueman(2000) finds 
that gross profits are positively and significantly associated with stock price. Moreover, he also finds that the 
bottom-line net income positively associates with stock price for preissuers. Arosio, Giudici and Paleari (2000) point 
out those issuing directors rely on private information signalled by the revision of the final offer price, compared to 
the initial file range. The more optimistic the price revisions in prospectus range after book-building activity, the 
higher the initial return since issuing directors are provided with good news. 
Arosio et al. (2000) state the controlling shareholders after the IPOs discover they are wealthier, and this is good 
news for them. Miche and Ljungqvist (2000) argue that the owners can minimize their wealth loss during the IPO 
process by retaining a large number of shares. Miche (2000) points out that an issuer selling more shares clearly 
stands to lose more than an issuer selling fewer shares for a given level of underpricing. 
Lahnerman and Tvershy (1979)) argue that issuers care about the change in their wealth rather than the level of 
wealth. Michel and Ljunqvist (2000) argue that owners care about underpricing to the extent that they stand to lose 
from it, and that any such losses are proportional to the number of primary (new) and secondary (old) shares being 
sold. 
Lioughran and Ritter (2002) stated that pre-issue shareholders sum the wealth loss from leaving money on the table 
with the wealth gain on the retained shares from a price jump, producing a net income in wealth for preissue 
shareholders. Ritter (2000) also argues that to avoid losing more money on the direct fee of underwriters, issuers like 
leaving money on the table. 
Ritter (2001) points out, in general, the wealth gain for preissue shareholder from the revaluation is greater than his 
or her share of the money left on the table. He also gives a formula for explaining the condition. The formula will be 
shown in the methodology section later. 
3. Data selection and methodology 
The main data in this research is collected from internet web site www.edgar-online.com. In this web site, we can 
access both the US and other international IPO markets. Because this study aims to investigate how those directors 
of listed companies to make profits when their leave money on the table, we believe which would be a market 
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scenario rather than a special period phenomena; therefore, we just culled available market data for this study 
between 1990 and 2002. In the US IPO market, we only can find 62 listed companies provided how many or 
percentages of IPOs owned by director or executive shareholders before or after public listing between 1990 and 
May 2002 (see Table Two).  In other international IPO markets, there were 655 IPO details available in 61 
countries up to June 2002 (see Table Three); however, only 94 provided such details to public (see Table Four) in 
the same period.   
The methodology used in this research is basing on Ritter (2002) formula; following Ritter(2000) data selection 
criteria: the IPO should issue ordinary common shares and should not be a unit offering, closed-end fund, real estate 
investment trust (REIT) or an American Depository Receipt (ADR); the IPO should have an offer price of at least 
$8.  
Ritter (2001) points out, in general, the wealth gain for preissue shareholder ( i) from the revaluation is greater than 
his or her share of the money left on the table, when the following condition is met: 
{Shares retained (i) + secondary shares sold (i)} * (OP - midpoint) + shares retained (i)   *{P- OP} 
› 
{P - OP} {Secondary shares sold (i) + primary shares sold * (shares retained (i) / shares retained)} 
where P is the market price, OP is the offer price, primary shares sold are being sold by the firm, secondary shares 
sold(i) are existing shares being sold by shareholders(i),  and the shares retained without a subscript are for all 
shareholders combined (see Barry (1989) for related work ).  For issuers with an upward revision of the offer price 
(upward revision means the offer price is above the initial file price range; midpoint is the middle of the initial file 
price ranges), this condition will be met unless shareholder (i) is selling a large number of shares in the offering or 
the offering is huge relative to the preissue number of shares. In practice, young companies going public rarely have 
any secondary shares in the IPO. 
It is clear that Ritter’s model is based on the situation that offer prices are higher than initial file price range (upward 
revision). Ritter (2002) agrees that among the IPOs which left money on the table in the whole world market, there 
are only about 24.3%of IPOs that have higher offer prices than original file price ranges. Considering this situation, 
we change Ritter’s formula as below: 
[Shares retained (i)* [P - midpoint] + secondary shares sold (i)* [OP -midpoint] 
> 
[P- OP]*[secondary shares sold (i) + primary shares sold *(shares retained (i)/ shares retained)] 
Actually, this new formula is same as Ritter’s. But in this study, we do not pay attention to the relationship between 
the offer price and initial file price range; we focus on the relationship between the first-day market closing price 
and the initial file price range. P, OP and i have the same meaning as Ritter’s.   
Due to the formula, the condition only can happen if (i) the market price (the first day closing price) is below the 
midpoint and ;( ii) shareholder only retains a little number of shares before or after IPO process. Because young 
companies going public rarely have any secondary of shares in IPOs [Ritter (2002)], so the most important factors in 
the formula are shares retained and [P- midpoint]. Issuing directors only can get benefits from money left on the 
table when they hold large number of shares and P-midpoint is positive. 
4. The empirical analysis   
Let’s take the example of Netscape’s IPO, where director Clark held 9.34 million shares. Based on the midpoint of 
the file price range of $12-$14, the expected value of his Netscape holdings was $121 million at the time that the 
preliminary prospectus was filed. At the closing market price on the first day of trading, his shares were worth $ 544 
million, a 350% increase in his pre-tax wealth in the course of a few weeks. So at the same time that he discovered 
that he had been diluted more than necessary due to the large amount of money left on the table, he discovered that 
his wealth had increased by hundreds of millions of dollars. Since he owned 28.2% of the company before going 
public, $43 million of the $151 million wealth transfer from preissue shareholders to new investors come out of his 
pocket. Although he lost $34 million, his gain is more than his loss. He got both news at the same time, bad news is 
that he lost some money on the table because of the underpriced IPO; good news is that he gained more money than 
he lost. This is shown as Panel A below: 
Panel A 
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Clark’s wealth gaining in IPOs 
shares 
offered 
(milion) 
offer 
price 
$ 
first-day 
price  $ 
money 
left 
$million 
initial 
file 
price $
retained 
shares  
(million) 
expected 
wealth 
$million 
actual 
wealth 
$million 
wealth 
gain  
$million 
net gain 
$million
5 28 58.25 43 12--14 9.34 121 544 423 380 
Source: www.edgar-online.com and 
Ritter’s (2000) web site http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/SDCCOR.PDF. Updated 25th May, 2000. 
Table Five shows the relationship between offer price, the file price ranges and first day closing market price for 
IPOs. The data is got randomly from www.edgar.online.com, the fourth column, the first closing market price come 
from Ritter (2001). From the 24 random samples, except of CONE ( its market price is lower than file price range), 
other 23 firms’ first day closing market prices all are higher than midpoint, so we argue that in  IPOs that left 
money on the table, the first closing market prices commonly are higher than file price ranges. It is clear that the 
first-day market closing price minus the midpoint (the middle of initial file price range) usually is positive, which 
means that P- midpoint is great than zero. 
Although Arosio et al. (2000), Miche and Ljungqvist (2000)  and Ritter (200)  all believe that directors can get 
benefits from money left on the table in IPOs with shares controlling, none of them gives the evidence that the 
preissue shareholders retain a large number of shares before or after firms going public.  
From Table Two, we can see that in the USA IPO market, the board of directors, on average, hold 62.25% of their 
equities prior to going public; after going public, the board of directors still control large percent of shares, average 
40.71%. Table Four exhibits the percentage of shares that are held by the board of directors in international IPO 
market, among the 94 firms, before going public, the directors, on average, own 54.63% equities of the companies; 
after going public, these directors still own about 45.29 percent of shares.  
From Tables Two and Four, it is clear that the preissue shareholders (issuing directors) always hold huge number or 
large percentage of shares either before or after their firms going public. So the second factor, issuing directors 
retain a large number of shares before or after firms going public, is absolutely prevailing in IPO markets around the 
world. Now, considering the formula, the directors always hold large number of shares before or after going public; 
the market price usually is higher than the file price range. Due to the both factors, the directors will get the high net 
benefit from the money left on the table. The greater the percentage of stock owned by top managers, the more 
likely they will make decision consistent with maximizing stockholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling 1976), since 
that will ultimately maximize their own wealth. 
We give another example , July 2000, Corvis company went to public, the offer price is $36.00, the first day closing 
market price is $84.72, the file price range is between $13- $15.The directors group own 148,549,248 shares,49.4%, 
prior to going public. The total issue shares are 31,625,000. The price of IPO jumped $48.72 per share.  The 
expected values of their holding shares are $2,079.69 million at the time the preliminary prospectus was filed 
(midpoint price * number of shares they hold, $14 *148.549 m= $ 2,079.69m). At the closing market price on the 
first day of trading, their shares’ value increase to $12,585 million ($84.72 *148.549 m).  This is $10,505million 
increase in their pre-tax wealth in the course in a few weeks. Although the directors left large amount money on the 
table about $716.14 million (the total amount left on the table is $1540.77 m= 31.625m *$ [84.72-36.00], those 
directors own 49.4% of total shares, so they left 49.4% of $1540.77m is $716.14m) in the IPO process, they gain 
more than they left the money on the table. We think they satisfied with the situation, because the net gain for the 
directors is: wealth gain minus money left on the table= 
$10,505million - $761.14 million =$9,744 million. 
Panel B 
Corvis company's directors' wealth gain from money left on the table in IPO 
shares 
offered 
(milion) 
offer 
price 
$ 
first-day 
price  $ 
money 
left 
$million 
initial 
file 
price $
retained 
shares  
(million) 
expected 
wealth 
$million 
actual 
wealth 
$million 
wealth 
gain  
$million 
net gain 
$million
31.625 36 84.72 761.14 13-15 148.549 2,079.69 12,585 10,505 9,744 
Source: www.edgar-online.com/ipoexpress  and http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/SDCCOR.PDF.  Update: 30th May, 
2002 
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From the above two examples, it is clear that when directors own large percent of shares prior or after going public; 
and the market price is higher than the midpoint (the middle price of the file price range), they will get the benefit 
from the money left on the table. The both factors are important for increasing their wealth in the IPO process. 
5. Conclusion.  
Ritter (2000) finds that there are huge amount of money was left on the table during the IPO process. He also finds 
that the preissue shareholders do not get upset about money left on the table and they can get benefit from the 
money left on the table. 
From the formula that was established by Ritter (2002), we find that Ritter bases his theory on the upward revision 
(the offer price is higher than the initial file price range).Because there are not many IPOs’ offer prices are higher 
than initial file price ranges (only about 24.3%) [Ritter (2002)], so we develop Ritter’s formula. 
In this new formula, we focus on the relationship between the first-day market closing price and the initial file price 
ranges rather than the relationship between offer price and the initial file price range. Depending on the new formula, 
we believe that the issuing directors get benefits from the money left on the table have to depend on two factors: 
they should hold a large number of shares before or after their firms going public; the first-day market closing prices 
must be higher than the initial file price ranges. 
We analysis the data from the United States and international IPO markets and find the most of IPOs’ first-day 
market closing prices are higher than the midpoint (the middle price of the initial file price ranges). And before or 
after firms going public, the issuing directors always hold large number of shares of their own firms. 
So that, the pre-issue shareholders (issuing directors) usually do not worry about the money left on the table, they 
can get benefit from the money left on the table depend on the shares retaining and the higher first-day market prices. 
This research provides a clear picture to help investors better understand primary market particular IPO market. The 
findings of this research may be used for future academic research literatures which focus on IPO or primary 
market.  
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Table 1. IPOs with a midpoint of the original file price range of at least $8.00, excluding ADRs, unit offers, 
closed-end funds, REITs partnerships, and stocks not listed on CRSP (mainly foreign firms going public in the U.S. 
without ADRs). 
Year Number of IPOs Average First-day Return Aggregate Amount Left on the table $billion 
1990 89 9.46% 0.3 
1991 250 11.37% 1.39 
1992 338 9.87% 1.65 
1993 437 11.64% 3.12 
1994 319 8.56% 1.37 
1995 366 20.38% 4.16 
1996 572 15.99% 6.45 
1997 391 13.80% 4.22 
1998 267 21.76% 4.95 
1999 446 70.89% 35.2 
2000 333 57.29% 26.69 
Source: Jay Ritter (U of Florida, 352.846.2837). Not: if smaller IPOs are included (those with a midpoint of the offer price range of less than 
$8.00), the number of IPOs increases. If foreign IPOs are included, the amount of money on the table increases. 
The amount of money left on the table is defined as the offer price to closing market price on the first-day of trading, multiplied by the number of 
shares offered ( excluding overallotment options) on a global basis. 
 
Table 2.The percentages and numbers of IPOs owned by directors and executives before or after companies listed 
(USA data up to May 2002) 
Symbol shares owned before offering to public shares owned after offering to public 
  Number   Percentage of shares Number  Percentage of shares 
VRST 8501380   56.1 8501380    
ODSY 12284402   54.01      
SGEN 12598928   58.3      
GIVN 15748574   83.3 17248574  57.2 
EXAS 3390387   53.5      
KCIN 2520298     2520298    
AFCE 30372748   70.3 30372748    
LGVN     43.2      
GLYN 5994830   57.5 5994830  36.8 
REVU     59.19 11535524  43.33 
SWSH     11    9.6 
WMGI     85.31 18525875  54.35 
CCRN     5.9    4.5 
MOSY 14454182   58.5 1302500  48.7 
MDTH 12073379   95.5      
ORH 48000000   100 48175000  73.9 
MXRE 3139075   10.7      
NRGY 1583256   47.8 572542  40 
SWRG 2599099   57.3      
HGOI 10884520   56.48 10854520  53.8 
GME       14535775  21.8 
INDI       10144100  95.7 
GLAD       1293508  13.5 
HPLA     87 17524328  57.1 
APPX 35913113   99.18      
AMGP 15599254   52.7      
AHS 5473055   95.8      
RMK       152180405  90.5 
BFUM     87.1 7740850  55.7 
BRZZ     20.51    13.57 
DJO 9958209   97.7 91804053  49.9 
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FPH          19.9 
CHFN       278000  5.2 
ALPE     89.89    88.85 
DVS     99.3 3972000  79.3 
LAVA     52.4    38.8 
OMCL 213898   54.4 1056238  39.4 
ABCO 4097172   25.4 4097172  32.3 
PETC     15    11.3 
WOOF     92.3 15815574  55.1 
SCNO          11.4 
TWLO       1550000  48.8 
TASR     95.1    59.5 
PULX     17.9    14.5 
MDCV     45.8 3303912  37.9 
ZGEN     100      
WTW 22299450   94.9      
MHLXU 878482   50.5 1535811  41.1 
WLWD     85.58 3015001  58.53 
WSTX 540179   28.5 540179  18.5 
THER 13930555   44.73 754926  37.82 
KMR       29230190  25.29 
AIO     92.8 35987040  75.1 
MLTC     33.35    47.9 
TELM     30.2    27.7 
OIS 25572535   75.5      
GMR     13.1    9.9 
ICH     80.5    55.3 
AQA     54    48.8 
SLMC          96 
GMXR     100    50 
ATPG     100      
SUM     3175.03    1954.14 
MEAN     62.25%    40.71% 
Source:  
The data is from the web site www.edgar-online.com , update 31st May 2002. 
In each firm’s report, only the shareholders who own more than 5 % of the total shares will be listed. All directors and executive officers are 
treated as a group. 
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Table 3. The numbers of IPOs listed in different countries up to 30th June 2002 (excl. USA) 
country sample number country sample number country sample number 
Argentina 7  Germany  15  Puerto Rico 2 
Australia 7  Greece 8  Russia 6 
Austria 2  Hungary 2  Scotland 1 
Bahamas 1  Iceland 1  Singapore 5 
Belgium 3  India 6  Spain 3 
Bermuda 26  Indonesia 1  Sweden 9 
Brazil 9  Ireland 9  Switzerland 8 
Jamaica 1  Israel 58  Taiwan 2 
British Virgin  Italy 3  Nether land 24 
Island 11  Japan 5  Turkey 1 
British west   Jordan 1  U. K 46 
Indies 4  Korea 3  US Virgin   
Canada 244  Luxembourg 4  Island 2 
Channel    Malaysia 1  Venezuela 1 
Island 1  Mexico 6  Thailand 2 
Chile 6  Netherlands 1  West India 1 
China 54  Antilles 1     
Colombia 1  New Zealand 3     
Costa Rica 2  Norway 5     
Denmark 1  Panama 1     
Dominican 1  Peru 2     
Ecuador 1  Philippines 1     
Finland 1  Portugal 2     
France 19  Prince Inward     
      Island 1       
Source: the data is from www.edgar-online.com/express-ipo, update is 30th June 2002 
 
Table 4. The percentage of shares owned by directors and executives 
     
COUNTRY   TICKER BEFORE GO TO PUBLIC AFTER GO TO PUBLIC 
           
      NUMBER PERCENTAGE NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
ARGENTIA  LCTO  87.5  26575384 68.9 
    IMPT 42406315 56.9   42485394 46.4 
AUSTRALIA   TBA       12491250 73.4 
   ASIO 5559999 66.5     
    ITTE 16550000 93.43   15850000 74.24 
AUSTRIA   TBA   95     58.46 
BERMUDA   ESREF 2682129 100   3677820 69.9 
   FTHL 107982096 100  102682096 79.54 
   GBLX 172759314 88.99  170819314 80.9 
   IWAV  75.8   61.7 
   MRVL  70.5     
    WPL 5151983 10.8   4918987 10.39 
BRAZIL   BRS   87.25     86.25 
CANADA   TSIX 9840000 12   3325400 5 
   TBA 2500000   2500000 71.42 
   AML 5000000   5000000 71.43 
   AAI  50.8   43.43 
   AISI  100   54 
   ATAG    2854900 38 
   ATC  13.5   12.5 
   MMC    2522000 71.43 
   TBA    50000000 71.42 
   BVI     49.5 
   BPOU     58.4 
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   TBA    150000 73.17 
   BIVI    5550000 41.04 
   BMI 304000 50.8  304000 43.43 
   BCC  40   28.5 
   BADC  12   9.1 
   TBA    2500000 43.5 
   XAIN    150000 73.17 
   XMLG    6535000 23.9 
   XUNA    4490000 89.8 
   YACO    1725800 42.2 
    TBA         71.43 
CHANNEL ISLAND             
    AMDO       1725188824 87.2 
CHINA   AONL 18578575 54.85       
   ASIA 10551535 70     
   ASTV    5351280 49 
   CVMI 823084 22  823084 15.5 
   EIEF  48.9   34.2 
   HIOW  33.9   10 
   ICAB    1500000000 81.5 
   JADEF    3787200 59.5 
   NEWC  43.2   3.52 
   SOHU 4031257 38.9     
    TBA       33915555 24.42 
COSTA RICA   CATB       6595970 55 
    TBA       2083350 14.5 
FRANCE   ACTI   13.5     12.1 
    TBA   70     71.2 
GERMANY   ISHP   27.5     25.5 
    TRIN   52.5     44.2 
HUNGARY   EEFT 4529458 40.5   4042295 27.99 
INDIA   INDT   77.57     63.02 
   INFY  31.7   20.8 
    SIFY 370100 2.2   370100 1.7 
ISREAL    ACCD   10.1     7.6 
   BWEB  29.5   24.9 
   CAMT 16284557 99.7  16284557 74.2 
   CTVN  67.2     
   CKSW  53.3   50.1 
   GIVN 16748674 83.3  17248674 67.2 
   KERX  58.85     
   MNDO  53.8   45.8 
   NURTF    4462954 38.45 
   RVSN 9014764 65.4  7922932 43.6 
    VRYA 7934168 41.9   7954168 33.9 
JAPAN   IIJI   15.31     15.15 
LUXEMBOURG               
   CONE    31003890 92.8 
    FMRK   100       
MALAYSIA  MYWB    2137750 19.8 
NETHERLAND               
    STNN   71.63     25.88 
POLAND   NTIA 143910 0.59   143910 0.54 
SINGAPORE               
   STTS 13332500 1.7  13325000 1.4 
    UTAC       244592312 43.1 
SWEDEN   IMIC 12181058 98.2   10981058 70.4 
THE NETHERLANDS             
   CBI    752953 5.1 
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   CRUZ  84     
    UPC   94.2       
UK   AREM 52312872 52.9   53123872 38.3 
   TBA  58.21   58.21 
   HGOI  55.48   53.8 
   KNII  87.8   57.4 
   LTGI  93.8   58.9 
   TPC  95.83   57.24 
    WSH   11     9.6 
US VIRGINISLANDS             
   UTIW 1898314 9.5  1960814 7.9 
                
TOTAL       3332.19     3497.97 
AVERAGE       54.63%     45.29% 
The data is from web site www.edgar-online.com , in the international IPO performance, there are 61 countries and areas are listed on the web 
site. Among the 655 IPOs, only 94 firms exhibit their conditions of shareholders, prior or after going public. The firms only list the shareholder 
who owns more than 5 percent of shares, the directors and executive officers are treated as one group. 
 
Table 5. The offer and first day closing prices of IPOs  
Ticker symbol Offer price $ File Range price $ First Day Closing price $ 
COPV 36 13-15 84.72 
SCMP 38 18-20 184 
AKAM 26 16-18 145.19 
AWE 29.5 26-32 32.6 
LNUX 30 11--13 239.25 
FMKT 48 14-16 280 
AVNX 36 13-15 172 
CONE 17.48 65-75 34.5 
WEBM 35 11--13 212.62 
MCDT 28 19-21 85.56 
FDRY 25 14-16 156.25 
KCIN 18 6.75-8.75 23.48 
ISIL 25 18-20 54 
STOR 27 17-19 90.25 
TRRA 13.41 13.41 38.25 
FNSR 19 12--14 86.875 
CHTR 19 17-19 22.75 
GIGM 27 27 88 
COBT 22 14-16 128.125 
PCLN 16 7--9 69 
CFLO 24 11--13 126.37 
UTIS 18 12--14 57.25 
ONIS 25 14-16 82.56 
AVCI 31 18-20 96.75 
Source: www.edgar-online.com , Update 11th, June, 2002. 
  
 
 
  
